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The British and rubber in Malaya, c 1890–1940
Jim Hagan and Andrew Wells*
University of Wollongong
This paper aims to explain the relations between Capital and Labour on the rubber plantations in Malaya until the
time of the Japanese invasion. It examines the way in which the British acquired and controlled land as a resource,
and the ways in which companies raised and applied investment capital. It considers the means of recruiting an
adequate supply of labour, and controlling it as a workforce; it demonstrates a close relationship between the rubber
companies and the State, which was modified by the special interests of the State itself.

Land and capital
The British established a settlement on the island of Singapore at the beginning of the nineteenth century,
but it was not until some 50 years later that they began to take a serious interest in the Malay peninsular
proper. By then British traders and adventurers had involved themselves in the affairs of the Sultanates
that were later to become the Federated Malay States. On behalf of British subjects (and especially
those interested in exploiting tin deposits), the Government of Great Britain interfered in disputes over
succession to the Sultanates, and ‘in the 1860s and the 1870s, disputes over the succession claims in
Perak, Selangor and Sungei Ujong were transformed from the normal short feuds to prolonged and
bloody wars’.1 In each case, the claimant who emerged victorious paid a price to his British allies.
He became a Sultan in name only, stripped of all the important powers that once went with that office;
his Council retained only ceremonial powers, and both he and it were subject to the advice of a Resident,
appointed by the British, who held all real legislative, executive and even judicial power.2
The Residents used their powers to implement systems of landholding that were extremely generous
to capitalists seeking to establish plantation estates. In devising them, the British were able to build on
Malayan custom and practice. The Sultans had recognised a form of land tenure established through
usufruct and had levied taxes on the land payable in kind.3 The Residents adapted the system to allow
lease or purchase of land by means of cash. All land was vested in the Head of State, so that thousands
of acres of virgin land could be sold or leased with legal title. Malays who had their customary tenure
converted into ownership could also sell their land.
Leasehold tenure was particularly generous to the intending plantation owner. The principle of
‘permanent settlement’ applied: the lessees could hold land for up to 999 years without any increase in
the lease fee. In this way, the Government alienated estates of some thousands of acres for peppercorn
rents. Sir Frank Swettenham, then president of Selangor, but later to become High Commissioner of the
Federated Malay States, justified the system on the grounds that both cheap land and security of tenure
were necessary to attract a sufficient number of investors.4
Some of Swettenham’s fellow Residents, and officials of the Land Departments, pointed out that this
system deprived the Government of a most important source of revenue. The British Colonial Office was
strongly opposed to the levying of income or company taxes, and in their absence land sales and fees
were potentially the single most important revenue source, especially since the value of land would rise
as its exploitation proceeded. In 1898, the year after the formal establishment of the Federated Malay
States, it was agreed to supersede the system of leasehold with permanent settlement, and substitute a
system based on the Australian system of Torrens Title, which would confer freehold ownership on the
cash purchaser, and supply the Government with revenue which it could use to build roads and railways
to serve the needs of the plantation owners. But the law as drafted had many loopholes, and in practice
the land offices of the Federated Malay states continued to offer some land under long-term lease.5
Until early in the twentieth century, most applicants wanting large areas of land in Malaya had been
seeking tin concessions, or planning to grow plantation crops like tapioca and coffee. The demand for
land rose sharply when companies formed in Britain began to seek land for rubber plantations. Except
in times of trade recession, demand continued until 1940, when rubber plantations in Malaya spread
over 2.1 million acres.
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The lure of the cash these companies were able to offer through their agents often proved irresistible
to the native Malays who had acquired title to the land they had held through customary tenure.
The Government of the Federated Malay States noted in 1912 that it had been caused
grave anxiety and apprehension by the fact that our Malay subjects, deluded by visions of all
but transitory wealth, have been divesting themselves of their homestead and family lands to
anyone willing to pay in cash for them. The rulers of the Federated Malay States and their Advisers
conclusively feel that unless a better judgement is exercised on their behalf, the result will be the
extinction of the Malay yeoman peasantry.6

The result was the Malay Reservations Act of 1913, which provided that land within a Malay reservation
was not to be sold or leased to a non-Malay, as thousands of acres had already been. The official reasoning
was that the rapidly increasing populations of the rubber plantations would need huge quantities of rice.
It would be possible to import rice, but a home- grown supply would be cheaper, and more reliable.
Officially, it was to be the role of the native Malays to supply food for the workers in the rubber
plantations and tin mines.
Further acts of 1917 and 1918 supplemented the Act of 1913. These were aimed at ensuring that the
Malays used the lands reserved to them to grow rice, and did not use them to set up smallholdings in
rubber. Colonial policy went further than this, and aimed directly at preventing rubber cultivation by
Malays in smallholdings from competing with plantation rubber. The principal means to this end was
through the manipulation of land policy. By the time the Malay Reservations Act was passed in 1913,
Malays had been growing rubber for some years on the land to which they had acquired tenure through
custom, but also on land they had managed to buy. These smallholdings were usually family affairs,
often worked only from time to time. They were, according to the Government, poorly cared for and
a source of weeds and plant diseases, which would infest the plantations and involve their owners in
considerable expense.7
The land offices of the Federated Malay States discouraged the Malays from acquiring land for rubber
production, and discriminated against them. They reserved virgin land close to railways and main roads
for purchase by non-Malays, and in 1915, 1916 and 1917 refused to sell any land at all to Malays for the
purpose of rubber planting.8
Malayan land policy in the years of the great expansion of the rubber plantation industry, offered land
to foreign investors, and especially British foreign investors, on extremely attractive terms. Besides
that, for a time, the Government offered loans on very easy terms to intending British purchasers,
and discriminated in their favour against native Malays in choice of sites.9 The policy of confining as
far as possible land use by Malays to the cultivation of food crops also helped reduce the danger of
over-supply of Malayan rubber for sale on the world market.

Capital and labour
By 1906, British capitalists were seizing the opportunity to make fortunes by investing in Malayan rubber
plantations. Companies sometimes paid dividends of over 200 per cent, and agency houses amassed
huge profits in the buying and selling of plantations. Apart from some ups and downs depending on
the world rubber price, the area continued to expand until halted by the world depression which began
in 1929. In that year, the rubber plantation companies were employing about 258, 000 coolies on their
estates.
Most of these men and women – about 80 per cent – came from Southern India, where Madras Presidency,
like much of the rest of India, was a fertile recruiting ground. Frequent failure of the monsoon resulted in
drought and famine; the system of taxation the British Raj imposed exacerbated poverty and indebtedness.
The people most affected were Untouchables and of the lowest castes. Recruitment for employment in
Malaya was often an alternative to starvation, both for themselves and the families they left behind.
Until 1912, most Indians were recruited under indenture. Agents for recruiting firms visited villages,
offered a cash advance to men and sometimes women willing to put their thumbprint to an indenture
agreement. This provided that the recruit would work for a specified employer (and no-one else) for a
fixed period (usually three years) to his employer’s satisfaction, and for a fixed wage. The cash advance
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was a charge against the money the coolie would earn; if he succeeded in repaying it within the period
set by the indenture he was free to leave the plantation; if not he had to remain and work off his debt.
If he left before he had acquitted his debt and served his time, he was subjected to criminal penalties.
By 1910, at the time when the number of rubber plantations was increasing rapidly, plantation owners
were discovering that the indenture system was unsatisfactory. The Parr Inquiry of that year found that
the system lent itself to corruption and fraud, which was expensive; despite the ordinance on crimping,
coolies who risked criminal punishment by running away readily found employment with another estate,
often at a higher wage. Moreover, the coolies were not coming in sufficient numbers, because other
destinations were more attractive.10
The main purpose of the indenture system was to secure a reliable supply of labour to the plantation
employers at the lowest possible wage. The Parr inquiry found it was failing to do this. Parr’s solution
was to abandon recruitment by indenture and replace it with a system of mass immigration by ‘free’
labourers.11 The Government accepted the recommendation, and the Indian Immigration Fund, already
established, would pay for the passages of ‘free’ coolies to Malayan ports. Employers contributed to
the Fund according to the number of Indian coolies they employed. They hired their labourers not
through professional agencies, but via Kanganis – senior plantation employees who travelled to India
and recruited among fellow villagers, tribe, family and caste. The recruit did not sign an indenture, and
in law was free to leave his employment after giving due notice.12 Kangani recruitment in combination
with assisted passages brought hundreds of thousands of coolies to Malaya and largely achieved the
employers’ objectives. Sheer numbers reduced the wages of plantation labour to a minimum, and
the social ties and obligations established by Kangani recruitment helped keep the coolies working
obediently on the one plantation for long periods.13
The Parr Inquiry also investigated the recruitment of Chinese labour, which differed from that of the
recruitment of Indians. Chinese who were mustered in hostels in Chinese ports then travelled to a depot
in Singapore, usually on the ‘credit ticket’ system, which obliged them to work for the ticket’s purchaser.
This was always a labour contractor, who would assemble his coolies at the depot (often amid scenes
of great disorder which bordered on riots) and take them to a kongsi house he had built on the estate of
the plantation owner with whom he had contracted. Here, the coolies would work under his supervision,
he would pay them, and the estate management would have no direct contact with them. Chinese
employed on this contract system made up about a third of the plantation workforce in 1931.14
Both systems of labour were regulated by various acts and ordinances, which dated from the 1870s.
Those relating to Indians were consolidated into the Labour Code of 1912, which laid down certain
requirements regarding working hours, pay, housing and accommodation, which were supplemented
later by other Acts. There was a Labour Department headed by a controller of Labour, who could inspect
premises, and even close them down.15 The Controller could also hear complaints from coolies, and he
sometimes prosecuted overseers for violence against them.
Administrative arrangements for the supervision of Chinese labourers were different from those
applying to Indians. Since the coolies worked under a contract system, the management of the
plantation was not their employer in law, and the detailed regulation of the Labour Code did not apply
to Chinese plantation workers. There was instead a Protector of Chinese, with deputies in the various
Federated Malay States.
The system of contract labour lent itself to serious and frequent abuse, which the overworked staff of
the Protector could do little to check, but this did not deter Chinese from coming in numbers that the
Government considered adequate. It was, in fact, wary of any influx of Chinese which would add to the
large numbers of them already permanently residing on the Straits Settlements and the Federated Malay
States. So Government policy tended to concentrate on augmenting the supply of Indian labourers, who
also had the advantage, from the point of view of both plantation owners and the Government, of being
more docile. Encouragement of ‘free’ Indian immigration resulted in an adequate surplus of arrivals
over departures in almost all the years up to 1930. The manager of the Immigration Fund also used it to
encourage the recruitment of women and family groups by allowing their admission and employment at
a lower rate of levy on the estate owner; and in the 1930s, the Fund actually paid a bonus to the estate
owners on each coolie they recruited locally, provided they paid a small fee for their registration.16
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The aim of these measures was to establish as quickly as possible a local plantation workforce born
of Indian migrant parents.17 This would help solve a difficult problem for the Government: how to
keep wages at something like the minimum rates the Rubber Growers’ Association and the Planters’
Association of Malaya wanted, without having to resort to the mass migration of Indians – which the
Indian Government was increasingly reluctant to agree to, and in fact refused to allow from 1938.
The Planters’ Association of Malaya (PAM) was an association of rubber planters organised on the basis
of local associations in Malaya. It later enlarged its membership to include planters of other crops and
become the United Planters’ Association of Malaya (UPAM). The Rubber Growers’ Association had
its headquarters in London, and its members were representatives of companies and agency houses.
In 1927, the RGA had 87 members, whose firms had issued capital to the value of £106 million, most
of it invested in the rubber plantations in Malaya.18
Both Associations lobbied very actively, the RGA in London, mainly on matters to do with the supply
and marketing of rubber. The [U] PAM, made up largely of their managerial employees, dealt with
the Straits Settlement and Federated Malay States governments, directly on matters of industrial
conditions and relations. The two colonial Governments consulted closely with the [U] PAM, and
their legislatures included [U] PAM members. The guiding principles of the Association’s industrial
policy were three fold: to limit the interference of the Government in what its members considered
were purely matters of domestic management on their plantations, which meant a minimalist
interpretation of the Labour Code; to restrict the movement of ‘free’ labour by ordinances against
‘crimping’19 and by internal agreements among members; and to keep the supply of ‘free’ labour as
large as possible to depress wages to a minimum. Even in 1931, in the depths of the Great Depression,
the Planters’ Association attempted to slow the rate of repatriation of unemployed Indian labourers for as
long as possible.20
The Association’s low wage policy had brought it into direct and chronic confrontation with the Agent
of the Government of India in the 1920s. Following the Montague-Chelmsford reforms of 1918, the
Government of India became much more amenable to the pressures of the Indian National Congress.
Congress members took a keen interest in the employment of Indians abroad, and especially their wages.
After some negotiation, the Government of the Federated Malay States agreed to the appointment to the
Indian Immigration Committee (which administered the Indian Immigration Fund) of an Agent of the
Government of India. The Committee then proceeded to conduct a series of inquiries whose purpose
was to set wages for certain districts in the FMS.21
The Planters’ Association presented statistics to the Committee to demonstrate that the wages it proposed
allowed coolies to achieve the standard of nutrition necessary to help keep them in healthy working
order. The Committee accepted this minimal standard, and set wage rates accordingly.22 The Government
encouraged the coolies to contribute to their own subsistence by requiring plantation owners to set aside
very small plots (one sixteenth of an acre) on which the longer serving coolies might graze animals or
grow food, a concession the estate owners were reluctant to make.23
This issue assumed even greater importance in the Depression, when the price of rubber slumped
to a few pence per pound, planters began to dismiss their coolies, and a massive repatriation began.
The wage standards set by the Immigration Committee in 1930 became irrelevant, with the connivance
of the Government, and coolies left in droves.24 Yet it was obviously desirable to try to retain some part
of the workforce against the time when recovery could begin.
This occurred about 1934, and immigration resumed. In 1936, a Committee of Inquiry visited Malaya
on behalf of the Government of India, and recommended that immigration cease unless the Planters’
Association restored wage rates and conditions to their 1928 level. It did, briefly, but then threatened
to reduce them again; when it did, the Government of India prohibited State-assisted immigration to
Malaya from 1938 thenceforth, planters had to rely on local residents and unassisted migrants to supply
their workforce – which, as it turned out, they were able to recruit in sufficient quantity for estate owners
not to have to raise wage rates significantly. A trade recession in 1938 helped them hold the line, but in
September 1939, with demand for both rubber and tin booming, the UPAM petitioned the Government
to use the Indian Immigration Fund to import Javanese labour.25
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Labour resistance and reaction
The Government had been able to curb the oversupply of Indian coolie labour in the depths of the
Great Depression through manipulation of the Immigration Fund. It had no such power over Chinese
immigrants, so in 1931 it enacted an Immigration Ordinance to apply to them, and followed it two years
later with the Aliens Ordinance of 1933. These ordinances together set quotas and restored the number
of Chinese who could arrive as deck passengers.26
The ordinances applied only to males, and one of their unintended consequences was a significant
increase in the female component of the Chinese plantation workforce. It became more settled, and
coolies living near the estates began to supply a much greater proportion of the local labour. This had
consequences for the authority of the contractors who did not have the same control over locals as over
coolies who were recruited in China, and who owed passage money. Local labour reacted more strongly
against abuses like short and irregular payment. But that alone cannot explain the increase in militancy
after 1936, which culminated in the General Strike among rubber workers in 1937. This was due to
the increased demand for labour which came with recovery in 1934 and afterwards, and the tactical
exploitation of that bargaining advantage by the Malayan Communist Party.27
A Communist Party had operated in Malaya in the 1920s, but as a branch of its Chinese parent.
The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was established in 1930 by decision of the Comintern and its
chief industrial front, the Malayan General Labourers’ Union, a few days later. Police raids almost
wiped it out at birth, but it recovered sufficiently to be able to integrate itself with various ‘red’ and
‘grey’ unions by 1934. These operated mainly in Singapore, but by 1935, the Party organisation was
beginning to supply skilled cadres for the organisation of strikes among Chinese workers on rubber
plantations. The MCP’s membership was almost entirely Chinese, and at this stage it had neither the
means nor the ambition to reach out to Indian plantation coolies.28
In February 1937, a strike occurred among Chinese workers on a British owned estate in Kajang.
The Selangor Rubber Workers’ Union called for a general strike of all rubber workers in the State, and
it began on 7 March. The strikers’ main demand was for a hefty increase in wage rates, but they also
made a series of other claims, including freedom to operate trade unions legally. The strike spread
beyond Selangor onto estates in Penang, Malacca and Johore, and into the colliery that supplied the
tin mines and the railways. The police broke up demonstrations, and shot dead two of the strikers.
The Government called in a Punjabi regiment, and the police made mass arrests, but the strike continued
until mid August. The terms of settlement included a substantial rise in wage rates to 75 cents per day,
and stricter rules to control abuses by contractors. The Government agreed to extend the provisions
of the Labour Code to cover Chinese workers, and subsequently spent much more time monitoring
their operations. The terms of the settlement of the strike applied only to Chinese workers, but their
victory also produced a gain for Indian coolies because it prodded the UPAM into accepting the wage
recommendations of the Sastri Inquiry.29
The Government had suspended assisted Indian immigration in 1931, but resumed it in 1934. Drought
and famine in Southern India assured a plentiful supply, and in 1934 and 1935, over 155,000 Indians
arrived in Malaya with a willingness that rendered recruitment by kanganis unnecessary. Intervention
by the Controller of Labour secured employment for the immigrants at the rates of 35 cents per day
for men, and 28 cents for women in May 1934. Over the next two years of strongly improving rubber
prices, the UPAM refused to restore rates of pay to pre-Depression levels. In 1936, the Government
of India pressed for an inquiry into the payment and conditions of Indian labourers in Malaya.
Headed by V.N. Sastri, the Inquiry recommended restoration of the pay rates to the pre-Depression levels of
50 cents and 40 cents respectively. The 1937 strike of Chinese coolies removed any doubts the members
of the UPAM might have had about accepting the recommendations, and they paid the new rates from
April. Even so, Indian rates were well below Chinese, and parity of payment became an issue that
industrial organisation could focus on.30
But no successful industrial action was possible immediately. A fall in the demand for
rubber led the UPAM to threaten to reduce the rates it had recently accepted.31 The Indian
Government responded by banning the migration of Indian labourers to Malaya from May 1938.
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The UPAM carried out its threat, and for a while the ban had little effect. But the threat of war and then
the war itself brought huge increases in the demand for rubber, and the UPAM began to relent. At a time
when rubber plantation companies were making profits of up to 250 per cent, it restored Indian wage
rates to pre-Depression parity in October 1939, one month after the beginning of World War II.
These were the rates payable when the Klang District Indian Union (KDIU) was formed in mid 1940.
This organisation was one of the several industrial associations which had been formed after the Chinese
strike in 1937, and the visit to Malaya of Jawaharlal Nehru, who urged Indians to form trade unions
and agitate for improvements in their pay and conditions. The origin of the KDIU owed nothing to
the Malayan Communist Party, but certainly something to the Central Indian Association of Malaya.
The CIAM was an arm of the Indian National Congress, which had declared non co-operation with the
British war effort, and like its Indian parent, was composed mainly of high caste Indians now seeking
the alliance and support of Indian workers.32
The KDIU aimed, among other things, at parity of payment between Indian and Chinese plantation
coolies. In response to a series of small sporadic strikes, the UPAM offered a slight advance in pay
rates, and when the strikes did not stop, increased its offer to 60 cents for men and 55 cents for women,
per day, in April 1941. But the strikes still continued, involving over 20,000 Indian workers, and when
police action failed to restore order, the Government called in volunteer reserves, and then an Indian
regiment. Five strikers were shot dead, and scores wounded. After the arrest and deportation of their
leaders, the strikers drifted back to work in mid-May, with no advance on the April offer.33
In the early phases of the strike, the local British resident had been very reluctant to issue arrest warrants,
and the Controller of Labour had invited the CIAM to take part in negotiations. This the UPAM
considered almost tantamount to treason, and when the Controller refused to offer it guarantees of
support, it complained bitterly, and its complaints reached the ears of the Colonial Office. The Controller
was prevailed upon to take early retirement, even though the High Commissioner went on record as
believing that a good part of the blame for the strike lay with the undue concern of the plantation
managers and their London Directors for company profits and shareholders dividends. The UPAM
continued to assert that there was no genuine industrial basis for this strike, and blamed everything on
locally born hotheads.
The Government thought otherwise, and soon after the strikes ended, the Straits Settlement and Federated
Malay States Council enacted legislation that had been urged on them for some years. These Acts made
the registration of trade unions compulsory, and provided for reference of disputes to an industrial
tribunal. Restrictions on the membership of union executives were tight, strikes other than for strict
industrial purposes were illegal, and the government had extraordinary power of appointment to the
arbitral tribunals. The Acts aimed far more at restricting the influence of the Communist Party and the
CIAM, than at developing a trade union movement, but the Japanese Army invaded Malaya before they
were put to the test.

Conclusion: capital, labour and the state
To promote a prosperous rubber industry in Malaya was a continuing principle of British imperial
policy in the 40 years before the beginning of World War II. Malayan rubber plantations were not only
a source of considerable wealth for British companies and their shareholders; they provided the British
Government with a strategically essential product in times of war, and in times of peace one which
earned valuable overseas credits. The good health of Britain’s balance of payments depended in no small
measure on exports of Malayan rubber.
The metropolitan British and Malayan Governments adopted policies which heavily favoured rubber
estates owners. Governments in Britain and Malaya consulted closely with the RGA and [U] PAM,
and appointed their representatives to statutory bodies, and the Councils of the Federated Malay States
and the Straits Settlements. These two legislatures enacted law and oversaw administration, which
aimed to develop the prosperity of the rubber industry through development of the privately owned
plantation companies. The Governments acquired land, and made it available cheaply, on easy terms.
They provided legislation, which made it possible for companies to buy outright, land that Malays had
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held by customary tenure; they discriminated in the companies’ favour in land sales, and made things
difficult for competing smallholders. Land revenue funded roads and railways, and the companies
paid no taxation.
Similarly, the Government enacted labour laws, which heavily favoured the estate employers.
When the indenture system proved unable to provide Indian coolies in the numbers plantation owners
thought desirable, the Government replaced it with a system of ‘free’ labour supplied by an immigration
fund, which it could manipulate to increase or decrease the supply of labour. It tolerated the minimum
wage policy of the [U]PAM and the RGA; the wages of Indian coolies did not rise above statistically
calculated survival rates until 1941, and for much of the 1930s were below them. With Chinese
labour, it recognised but failed to redress the abuses of the contract system until the strike of 1937
compelled some action.
This is not to say that the rubber companies got everything they wanted. After the first few years,
and for the entire period of rapid growth in the number of rubber plantations, the planters did have
to pay enough for their land to make a substantial contribution to the development of infrastructure.
The Government enacted laws which subjected the health, housing, payment and discipline of their
Indian employees to inspection, and it occasionally prosecuted managers and even closed estates
down.
This reflected the view of the British Colonial Office and the Malayan Governments that the rubber
plantation industry was too important to be left to the rubber companies. Their interest was in quick
profit; the government was there for the long haul. One of its major considerations had to be the policy
of the Government of India, increasingly concerned with the welfare and status of its subjects overseas,
and virtual controller of the supply of Indian labour. Against the wishes of the [U] PAM, cheap labour
had to become a fraction dearer.
But when challenge to the control of the rubber companies over their employees began to emerge in
the 1930s, the bias of the Government’s policy was heavily in the favour of the owners. It deliberately
delayed legislation which would have helped the development of a trade union movement for employees
which might have acted as a counter to the trade unionism of the employers. It used police powers
to suppress the organisation of the Communist Party and the CIAM, and in the strikes of 1937 and
1941, it deployed military forces. On Government orders, Indian troops shot their coolie brothers.
The Controller of Labour who had attempted to temporise in negotiations was prevailed upon to resign.
The reaction was extreme, and some of the members of the Malayan administration were not happy with
it. One of these was the High Commissioner himself, who refused to accept the insistence of the RGA
and the UPAM that the massive disturbance in 1941 was simply the result of agitation of some local
young hot-heads and the failure of the Government to suppress it. The High Commissioner, instead,
blamed the Klang strikes on the subservience of local managers to British company directors in London
and their concern for maximising profits for shareholders. His words might almost have served as an
epitaph for the whole system.
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